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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-3993

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MARCUS TAYLOR
a/k/a MARCUS CHESTER TAYLOR
Marcus Taylor,
Appellant

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(Dist. Court. No. 03-cr-00025)
District Judge: Hon. Christopher C. Conner

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 2, 2004
Before: ALITO, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed April 9, 2004)

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Because we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts, the

procedural history and the contentions presented, we will not recite them except as
necessary to the discussion. This appeal requires us to decide whether a judgment of
conviction offered on a guilty plea should be reversed because the district court did not
explicitly inform Appellant Marcus Taylor in ipsissimis verbis of his right to plead not
guilty during the plea colloquy, as set forth in Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, although it fully informed him of his right to a jury trial.
Taylor’s counsel on appeal is the same assistant public defender who was present
at the guilty plea colloquy. She did not raise any objections during the colloquy, did not
call attention of the omission to the sentencing judge and made no timely post trial motion
to raise the question.
Taylor acknowledges that, because no objection was made in the district court, we
review for “plain error” only. See United States v. Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir.
1997). We act to correct such errors only when they implicate “substantial rights” and
“seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Id., quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997). “The burden is on the
defendant to show that the error in fact prejudiced him . . . .” Knobloch, 131 F.3d at 370.
We are satisfied that there was no plain error.
We have stated that Rule 11 “‘is not to be read as requiring a litany or other ritual’
and ‘should not be given crabbed interpretation that ceremony [is] exalted over
substance.’” United States v. Cefaratti, 221 F.3d 502, 508 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Rule 11,
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, advisory committee note (1983) (Rule 11 (h))).
The court notified the Appellant during the plea colloquy: “Mr. Taylor, you’re also
entitled to a jury trial in these matters in which you, through counsel would select a jury
consisting of twelve persons. . . . Any finding of guilt by the jury would have to be
unanimous, that is all twelve jurors would have to agree. . . .Do you understand your right
to a jury trial?” Taylor replied, “Yes.” The court then inquired: “And it is your desire to
give up your right to a jury trial and to enter a plea of guilty to the information?” Taylor
again replied in the affirmative.
In facing a similar challenge in United States v. Saft, the judge asked the defendant
if he understood “that if you did not plead guilty to these charges you would have the
right to a public and speedy trial by a jury of twelve people,” at which he could enjoy the
presumption of innocence and could be found guilty only by a unanimous verdict. 558
F.2d 1073, 1080 (2d Cir. 1977). Under these circumstances, there was no error in the
court’s failure to chant the magic words: “You have the right to plead not guilty.”
We feel that the foregoing is sufficient. W e note, however, other circumstances.
First, we are satisfied that the Appellant did not suffer any prejudice. This is clear by the
failure to contend otherwise in the brief.
Second, Appellant knew of his right to plead not guilty for the precise offense for
which he entered the plea agreement. The Harrisburg City Police arrested him on July 10,
2002, and charged him in the Dauphin County Court of the specific offense for which he
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entered the federal plea, “felon in possession of a firearm.” On October 10, 2002,
Appellant pled not guilty in the state court. He cannot possibly show lack of knowledge
of the right to plead not guilty, because that is precisely what he did in the state court on
the identical offense for which he was later charged in federal court.
We have considered all contentions raised by the parties and conclude that no
further discussion is necessary.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
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